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UNITED STATES v. FULLER: JUST
COMPENSATION UNDER ATTACK
By John F. Herlihy*
Introduction
Property owners have reason more than ever before to be apprehensive when confronted with eminent domain proceedings. The
source of this increased anxiety is the recent opinion delivered by Justice Rehnquist in United States v. Fuller.1 This opinion rejected the
holding of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals2 that compensation for
fee land taken by the government should include the value derived
by virtue of its location adjoining federally owned Taylor Grazing
Land.3 As a result of this Supreme Court decision, compensation for
land taken under eminent domain may in many instances be computed
without regard for the land's location value. Writing for the dissent
in Fuller, Justice Powell observed that this approach allows compensation to be determined after the land has been "artifically denuded of
its surroundings." 4
Can compensation which fails to consider the land's location value
be considered just compensation within the spirit of the Fifth Amendment?5 As early as 1880, Justice Field said:
[W]hen private property is taken for public use, the owner receives full compensation. The taking differs from a sale by him
only in that the transfer of title may be compelled, and the amount
* B.A., 1971, San Jose State University, J.D., 1974, University of California,
Hastings College of the Law.
1. 409 U.S. 488 (1973).
2. United States v. Fuller, 442 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1971).
3. This is land which is owned by the government and used by private individuals under the Taylor Grazing Act § 3, 43 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1970), formerly ch. 865,
§ 3, 48 Stat. 1270 (1934). For a discussion of the Taylor Grazing Act as it applies
to the Fuller decision see, Comment, United States v. Fuller-EminentDomain-Taylor Grazing Permits as an Element of Compensation for Condemned Land, 1973 UTAH
L. REV. 75.
4. 409 U.S. at 504 (Powell, J., dissenting).
5. Note that the Fifth Amendment protection ("nor shall private property be
taken for public use without just compensation") was provided as a check on the potential abuse of government's power. See text accompanying note 100 infra. See Stoebuck, A GeneralTheory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. RPv. 553 (1972).
[273]
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of compensation be determined by a jury of officers of the government appointed for that purpose. 6
Nearly a century later, Fuller has added a new distinction between
a governmental taking and a private sale. The addition is that the
amount of compensation for private property taken for public use may
not include location value in certain cases. The fundamental similarities between a private sale and a governmental taking, which Justice
Field believed the Fifth Amendment dictated, have been substantially
diminished by the patent disparity in compensation permitted by
Fuller.
The anxiety created by the Fuller decision for landowners and
those who represent them is primarily caused by the knowledge that
location value could be excluded from compensation; of equal importance is the knowledge that the Court has continued to accept the
modified market value theory.7 This theory, as well as other general
theories of compensation, must be considered in order to fully appreciate the alternatives before the Court.
General Theories of Just Compensation
No fewer than three approaches have been devised by courts to
arrive at an evaluation of just compensation. These can be referred
to as the strict market value rule, the modified market value rule,
and the indemnification theory.
The strict market value rule holds that compensation should be
equal to the conversion of the asset into its monetary equivalent. 8 This
theory is based on the belief that -the compensation should be for the
property alone, and should not consider the personal status of the owner.9 Commentators have criticized the strict market value concept for
its failure to compensate the condemnee for such incidental costs as
business losses and moving expenses.' 0 Even with its shortcomings,
6. County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 703 (1880).
7. See text accompanying notes 12-15 infra.
8. United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14 (1970); Olson v. United States, 292
U.S. 246 (1934).
9. In Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893) the
Court construed the Fifth Amendment to be personal except as it applied to just compensation. The Court decided that just compensation was in rem Nr nature. Compensation could be impossible for incidental losses to the owner because the Fifth Amendment did not recognize his personal rights. The Court held that "'just compensation'
is to be a full equivalent for the property taken." Id. at 326 . This is criticized in
Kanner, Condemnation Blight: Just How Just is Just Compensation? 48 No=E DAME
LAW 765 (1973) [hereinafter referred to as Kanner].
10. Kanner, supra note 9, at 778; see Comment, Eminent Domain Valuations in
an Age of Redevelopment: Incidental Losses, 67 YALE LJ. 61 (1957) [hereinafter cited
as Incidental Losses].
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adoption of the strict market value rule in Fuller would have resulted
in compensation for location value, because the market value included

location value.11

The Court in Fuller, however, used the modified market value
rule. This differs from the strict market value rule in that the Court
eliminates some element which would usually be included in computing fair market value. 2 The Supreme Court in United States v. Cors'3
justified this modified market value rule by suggesting that to make

a fetish of market value would unnecessarily restrict the Court's ability
to consider the equities involved in a given case. 14 Unfortunately the

Court seems inclined to put aside its fetish for market value more
readily when it is helpful in reaching the desired result.' 5
Dissatisfaction with the first two approaches has given rise to the
idemnification theory, which has found more support among commen-

tators than judges.' 6 One case in which .the Court alluded to this
theory stated it concisely: "The owner is to be put in as good position
pecuniarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been
taken."'

7

The indemnification theory is based in part on a liberal

construction of the social cost distribution policy.' 8

Justice Brennan

enunciated this policy in YMCA v. United States: "The Just Com-

pensation Clause was 'designed to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,

should be borne by the public as a whole.' "19

11. See United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 504 & n.8 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 493 (Court eliminated location value of land); United States v. Cors,
337 U.S. 325 (1949) (Court eliminated supply and demand element of market value).
13. 337 U.S. 325 (1949).
14. As stated by Justice Douglas: "The Court in an endeavor to find working
rules that will do substantial justice has adopted practical standards, including that of
market value. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374. But it has refused to make
a fetish even of market value, since that may not be the best measure of value in some
cases. At times some elements included in the criterion of market value have in fairness been excluded." United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949). Accord,
United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1961).
15. This is exemplified by the Fuller decision and United States v. Cors, 337 U.S.
325 (1949). Judicial disclaimers notwithstanding, the Court does make a fetish of
market value in most cases. Kanner, supra note 9, at 778. "Mheir willingness to
depart from 'fair market value' as the criterion of 'just compensation' is more likely
to materialize when such departure inures to the government's benefit." Id. at 808.
16. Kanner, supra note 9, at 784 n.92; Kanner, When Is "Property" Not "Property Itself': A CriticalExamination of the Bases of Denial of Compensation for Loss
of Goodwill in Eminent Domain, 6 CALI...W.L. Rn-v. 57 (1969); Incidental Losses,
supra note 10.
17. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943).
18. Kanner, supra note 9, at 783.
19. YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85, 89 (1969). Both the majority and

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. I

The notion that the public should bear the burden need not be
limited to the value of the land alone. As the idemnification theory
indicates, the actual costs to a condemnee may far exceed the value
of the asset, 20 and this burden should also be shared by the public. 2
Had the Court in Fuller adopted the indemnification theory, the result
certainly would have been more favorable to the landowners, since
putting the landowners in as good a position as before the taking
would require paying for the location value of their land.
Regardless of which general theory of compensation the Court
adopted in Fuller, there were two specific rules which had to be considered before deciding the case. First, any increase in value created
by the taking itself is not compensable.2 2 Second. the condemnor
must allow for the single tract theory which provides that when land
has been used as a single tract, this factor will be taken into consideration for compensation even when only a part of the tract is taken.2 3
These rules will be discussed here both abstractly and more concretely
with reference to Fuller.
This disregard for any increase in value which might be derived
from the taking runs contrary to the traditional concept of fair market
value.
By fair market value is meant the amount of money which a purchaser who is willing but not obligated to buy the property would
pay to an owner who is willing but not obligated to sell it, taking
into consideration all uses24to which the property is adapted and
might in reason by applied.
By eliminating increase in value caused by the taking, the Court places
the government in a substantially more favorable position than other
buyers vis-h.-vis the seller. Excluding what a willing buyer would pay,
one is left with only what a willing seller would ask, and if the seller
must ask a price without considering potential usages of the buyer,
he is likely to become an unwilling seller. The result is compensation based on neither fair nor market value principles. The legal fiction of fair market value becomes a legal fantasy.
Assuming for the moment that the government should not have
to pay for the increased value caused by its own taking, problems arise
the dissent agreed with this rule of law. The Court, however, held that compensation
should not be granted because they refused to accept the petitioners' factual premise.
20. Kanner, supra note 9, at 778.
21. For extensive discussions of the purposes of just compensation, see Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings and the Police
Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
22. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934).
23. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376 (1943).
24. Arkansas State Highway omm'n v. DeLaughter, 250 Ark. 990, 1000, 468

S.W.2d 242, 247 (1971).
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in the practical application of this reasoning. For example, how can
a court distinguish between enhancement due to goverment's need and
enhancement due to shortage of supply and increased demand by other buyers? The United States Supreme Court was faced with this
25
problem in UnitedStates v. Cors.
In Cors, the federal government, faced with an increased need
for vessels during the Second World War, requisitioned a tugboat which
it had sold to Cors seven months earlier. Cors sought to recover the
market value of the tugboat, but the United States Supreme Court
refused to measure value by that means, observing that, "[it is not
fair that the government be required
to pay the enhanced price which
'26
its demand alone has created.
Justice Frankfurter, writing for the dissenters, 7 replied:
We speak, in referring to the interacting forces of such a period,
of the 'inflationary spiral,' and although a requisition by the Government in the midst of this dynamic process undoubtedly has some
effect in accelerating it, it is an effect which loses its ascertainable
significance by being merged with countless other factors. 28
Disregarding the simple logic of the dissent, the Court denied recovery
of fair market value.29
The second rule which should be noted is the single tract theory.
As expounded by Justice Roberts, "[A] parcel of land which has been
used and treated as an entity shall be so considered in assessing compensation for the taking of part or all of it." 30 This rule is compatible
with the general theory of indemnifying the loss of the landowner,
inasmuch as it recognizes incidental losses in excess of what the landowner would have incurred had the parcel not been used as a part
of a larger tract.
A problem involving both of the preceding rules and analogous
to that involved in Fuller is the extent to which the government must
compensate a condennee for the increased value of land due to its
proximity to land previously taken for a government project. Justice
Roberts in United States v. Miller stated:
25. 337 U.S. 325 (1949).
26. Id. at 333.

27. Only Justices Jackson and Burton joined Justice Frankfurter. Chief Justice
Vinson dissented without comment.
28. United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 344 (1949).
29. Indeed, the Court's holding also disregarded the equities involved. The owner
had purchased his tugboat after the government had decided that they did not wish
to repair it. Cors spent much of his personal time and money repairing this boat only
to have the government requisition it seven months later. There is no indication that
Cors was speculating on the possibility of the government's exercising eminent domain
over his boat. On the contrary, all indications were that the government was not interested in this boat. Id. at 337-340.
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The question then is whether the respondents' lands were probably within the scope of the projects from the time the Government was committed to it. If they were not, but were merely
adjacent lands, the subsequent enlargement of the project to include them ought not to deprive the respondents of the value
added in the meantime by the proximity of the improvement. If,
on the other hand, they were, the Government ought not to pay
the known fact that the lands
any increase in value arising from
81
probably would be condemned.
In short, United States v. Miller leaves open the possibility of compensating for location value created by thei government. This was
the issue that split the Court five to four in Fuller.3 2
United States v. Fuller: The Opinion of the
Court and the Dissent
The respondents, Mr. and Mrs. Fuller, operated a ranch on a
tract consisting of land which they owned in fee simple, acreage which
they used by virtue of a permit issued under the Taylor Grazing Act,
and land leased from Arizona not involved in this case.33 In 1967
the United States instituted an eminent domain proceeding to acquire
920 acres of the fee land3 4 to be flooded as part of a dam and reservoir project in Arizona 5 In the district court, judgment was entered
on a jury verdict of $350,000. A two to one vote of the court of
appeals affirmed the judgment. 36
The issue as stated by Justice Rehnquist, writing the majority
opinion for the Supreme Court, was "whether the jury might consider
value accruing to the fee lands as a result of their actual or potential
use in combination with the Taylor Grazing Act 'permit' lands. '37 The
respondents stated the issue more precisely:
'[Iln determining the compensation due an owner of land taken
by the United States, the jury may consider the availability and
accessibility of public lands, so long as consideration is also given
the grazing permits on the public land may
to the possibility
38 that
be withdrawn.'
Thus, the respondents stressed the location value of their fee land
30. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376 (1943).
31. Id. at 377.
32. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Stewart, White and Blackmun joined. Justice Powell filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall joined.
33. 409 U.S. at 488-489.

34. United States v. Fuller, 442 F.2d 504, 505 (9th Cir. 1971).
35. 409 U.S. at 494-495.

36. 442 F.2d at 505.
37. 409 U.S. at 489.
38. Id. at 497 n.2.
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and made no claim for value to be attached to the permit itself.3 9
The Court, however, reasoned that the increase value was created
by a revocable government permit,4 0 that by statute the permit could
not create a compensable interest in the holder thereof, 4 and that
the land's proximity to permit land need not be considered for eminent
domain purposes. In sum, the Court held "that the Fifth Amendment
does not require the Government to pay for that element of value
based on the use of respondents' fee lands in combination with Government's permit lands."42
Justice Powell wrote the dissenting opinion in which he expressed
a preference for the repsondents' point of view:
[T]he favorable location is the central fact. Even if no permit
had been issued to these respondents, their three tracts of landlargely surrounded by the grazing land-were strategically located
and logical beneficiaries of the Taylor Grazing Act. In determining
the market value of respondents' land, surely this location-whether
has been issued-would enter into any rational estior not a permit
43
mate of value.
United States v. Fuller: An Analysis
The holding required that an exception be formulated for the
general rule that, "the highest and best use of a parcel may be found
to be a use in conjunction with other parcels, and that any increment
of value resulting from such combination may be taken into consideration in valuing the parcel taken."4 4 The Court determined that an
exception should be made "where the parcels to be aggregated with
the land taken are themselves owned by the condemnor and used by
the condemnee only under revocable permit from the condemnor." 45
Thus, the general rule which would have favored complete compensation for respondents' land including its location value was inapplicable
39. The Taylor Grazing Act specifically provides that the permit "shall not create
any right, title, interest, or estate in or to the lands." 43 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1947),
formerly ch. 865, § 3, 48 Stat. 1270 (1934). As a result, the respondents agreed that
the permit itself was not an item which if taken would have entitled them to compensation. 409 U.S. at 489. The dissent indicates that the government had misstated the
issue in their brief wherein the government implied that the respondents were claiming
value for the permit. Id. at 497 n.2. In addition the dissent suggested that the majority
based its decision, sub silentio, on the government's statement of the issue, Id. at 503,
notwithstanding the fact that the majority expressly adopted the respondents' statement
of the issue. Id. at 489.
40. 409 U.S. at 489-94.
41. See note 39 supra.
42. 409 U.S. at 493.
43. Id. at 503. (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
44. Id. at 490. See also text accompanying notes 26-29 supra.
45. Id. at 490-91.
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because of the exception. To support this exception the Court relied
46
upon two lines of cases. The first consisted of United States v. Cors,48
47 The second was the water rights cases
and United States v. Miller.
yet to be discussed.4 9
United States v. Cors and United States v. Miller
The opinion cited Cors5 ° to support the proposition that additional value created by the government itself should not be compensated by the government. 1 As applied by the Court to the facts
in Fuller, the value created by the permit lands would not be included
in just compensation. 2
The rule in Cors conflicted, however, with the rule in Miller
which granted compensation for "the increment of value resulting from
the completed project to neighboring lands originally outside the project limits, but later brought within them. 5 3 This conflict was resolved
by drawing a distinction between the "value added to property by a
completed public works project, for which the government must pay,
and the value added to fee lands by a revocable permit authorizing
the use of neighboring lands that the Government omns."' 54 The distinction which the Court drew was founded on the assumption that
completed public works are open to the public at large, while in Fuller
the government land was a privately controlled unit.Y This rationale
failed to consider, however, that since it was agreed that no right,
title, interest, or estate in the federal property could be acquired by
the permit holder,56 the permit land retained -at least to some degree
a similarity to land open to the public at large.
The most plausible explanation for this distinction was offered
by Justice Powell: "This is an acceptance of the Government's argument that the added value derives from the permit and not from
the favorable location with respect to the grazing land.
Thus, the
distinction which the Court used to avoid the rule in Miller was based
46. 337 U.S. 325 (1949).
47. 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
48. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967); United States v. Twin City
Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956); United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S.
386 (1945).
49. See text accompanying notes 70-88 infra.
50. See text accompanying notes 25-29 supra.
51. 409 U.S. at 491.
52. Id. at 493.
53. Id. at 492. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
54. Id. at 492.
55. Id. at 493.
56. See note 39 supra and text accompanying.
57. 409 U.S. at 503 (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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on a misunderstanding of the issue,5 8 and the rule in Miller should
have controlled the decision in Fuller, affording location value for the
respondents' land.
The Cors decision presents different problems. The majority interpreted Cors as holding that the government should not have to pay
for any increase in value which the government created. 59 There
are two basic reasons why that interpretation should not be sustained.
First, the rule places the government in an unnecessarily advantageous position vis-h-vis condemnees by isolating the government
from the realities of a free market.", Consider that when a private
party buys a parcel of land it enters the market realizing that it will
have to pay location value for the land.61 Although a private party
wishing to purchase the Fullers' ranch would have to pay for its location next to the permit land, the government need not do the same.
Placing the government in a much more favorable position than any
other buyer cuts severely into the equitable notion of fair market
Value.

62

- The second problem inherent in the rule arises upon attempting
to apply its reasoning. The Cors decision illustrates the problems
of application. The Court in Cors held that the government should
not have to pay for the enhanced value of the tugboat, since it was
the government's increased demand for ships which created the value.6 3 But how could the government separate the effect of its demand
on the market from that of other buyers whose demand had also increased? 4 In -an economy as complex as ,that of the United States
it could not be attempted without indulging in unwarranted speculation.
Although the rule in Cors may often put the condemnee in an
unfavorable position and may be impractical to apply, it is well suited
for situations in which "the enhanced value reflects speculation as to
what the government can be compelled to pay. That is hold-up value,

[W]hether or not a per58. "Mhe favorable location is the central fact ....
mit has been issued, [location value] would enter into any rational estimate of value."
Id. at 503 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also text accompanying notes 38-39 supra.
59. Id. at 492; United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 334 (1949).
60. See United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 238 (1956) (Burton, J., dissenting).
61. "The location of land is always a factor, and often a primary factor, in determining its market value. Every public utility exercising the right of eminent domain
is required to pay it." Id.
62. 409 U.S. at 504 (Powell, I., dissenting).
63. 337 U.S. at 334.
64. Id. at 344 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See text accompanying note 28 supra.
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not a fair market value."6 5 It is conceded that the government should
not have to pay for the increased value caused by its taking when
the condemnee is one who speculates on the possibility that the property will be taken. Acquiring property immediately preceding the
government's exercise of its power of eminent domain might be precipitated more often by insider information than for other reasons.
Public policy in such cases dictates that compensation be as small as
the Constitution allows in order to discourage and thwart attempts to
bilk the public. 66
The legitimate investor in property, however, should be distinguished from and not be treated in a manner similar to -the speculator.
If the facts show that his ownership was not instigated with a view
toward "selling" it to the government under condemnation proceedings, he should be afforded liberal compensation so as to assure the
social distribution of the cost.67 In Fuller there was no evidence or
allegation of speculation.
Addressing himself to Miller and Cors, Justice Powell stated that
these cases only support the "'modest generalization that compensation
need not be afforded for an increase in market value stemming from
the very Government undertaking which led to the condemnation."68s
Such an interpretation would have led to a quite different result. In
Fuller the value existed before and after the condemnation, as it was
derived from the land's location next to Taylor Grazing Land which
remained undisturbed by the dam and reservoir project. Thus, the
value did not arise from the "very Government undertaking which led
to the condemnation." 69
The Water Rights Cases7"
In addition to Miller and Cors, the Court in Fuller relied on the
water rights cases to support the exception to the rule7' that the government must compensate for the highest and best use of a parcel in
conjunction -with other parcels.7 2 The water rights cases eliminated
from consideration any element of value contributed to land by navi65. Id. at 334.

66. "mIhe Government ought not to pay any increase in value arising from the
known fact that the lands probably would be condemned." United States v. Miller,
317 U.S.369, 377 (1943).

67. See notes 18-19 supra and text accompanying for a discussion of the social
distribution of the cost policy.
68. 409 U.S. at 499 (Powell, I., dissenting).
69. Id.

70.
71.
72.
73.

See note 48 supra.
See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.
409 U.S. at 491.
United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 126 (1967); United States v. Twin City
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gable waters. 78 The reasoning was stated by Justice Lurton: "Ownership of a private stream wholly upon the lands of an individual is conceivable; but that -the running water in a great navigable stream is
capable of private ownership is inconceivable. ' 74 This position jseems
axiomatic. The government owns navigable waterways, but private
parties may not. If the private parties do not own the waterways then
they need not be compensated when the government uses those waterways. Yet, although no compensation need be given for the stream
itself, the location value of the land next to a navigable waterway
should be a factor in just compensation. Similarly, in Fullerthe Court
should have allowed compensation for the location value, which would
not require compensation for the permit itself.
These issues have not been adequately distinguished in the past.
In United States v. Twin City Power Co. 7 5 the confusion was illustrated by Justice Douglas' opinion:
Location of the lands might under some circumstances give them
special value, as our cases have illustrated. But to attach a value
of water power of the Savannah River due to location and to enforce that value against the United States would go contra to the
teaching of Chandler-Dunbar--'thatthe running water in a great
navigable
stream is capable of private ownership is inconceivable.' 76
While Justice Douglas' statement left open the possibility for increased compensation due to the land's favorable location, he did not
reach that conclusion because he reasoned that the result would mean
attaching a value to the water power, which is incapable of private
ownership. The problem could have been resolved by the realization
that the value was to be attached to the land and not to the water
power. Applying this rationale to Fuller, the respondents had a"right
to have a value attributed to their fee land, and not to the government
permit land.
Writing for the four dissenters in United States v. Twin City Pow-

er Co. Justice Burton made the distinction quite clear:
It is because of -thatland's location near, but apart from, the flow
of the stream that an additional fair market value, long recognized
in this land, was recommended and approved below. The location of land is always a factor, and often a primary factor, in
determining its market value. Every public77 utility exercising the
right of eminent domain is required to pay it.
The water rights decisions culminated in the recent case of
Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 228 (1956).
74. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 69 (1913).
75. 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
76. Id. at 227-28.
77. Id. at 238.
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United States v. Rands, 8 where the Court conceded that navigable
waters may enhance the market value of riparian property. The Court
still maintained, however, that any rights and value which the landowner may have acquired were "not property within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment, and need not be paid for when appropriated
' 79
by the United States."
Justice Powell pointed out in Fuller that the teachings of the water rights cases are subject to various interpretations."0 First, as interpreted by Justice Rehnquist:
[Tihe Government as condemnor may not be required to compensate a condemnee for elements of value that the Government
has created, or that it might have destroyed under the exercise
of governmental
authority other than the power of eminent do81
main.
This interpretation can lead to harsh results, as is evidenced by the
outcome of Fuller.
Second, according to Justice Powell, the water rights cases can
be limited to "the Government's 'unique position' with respect to 'navigable waters.' "82 In an attempt to explain the reasoning in the water
rights cases and to separate it from the problem posed in Fuller, Justice
Powell drew a distinction between the government as condemnor and
as property owner.8 3 The government need not compensate adjoining landowners for decreased value in their land due to a change in
the use of government owned property any more than would a private
property owner 8 4 As condemnor, however, its general obligation to
compensate is not open to question 8 5 -only the quantum of recovery
and its means of computation may be disputed. A clear understanding
of this distinction leads to the following conclusion: the broadest rule
which can be formulated from these cases is that "the Government
need not compensate for location value attributable to the proximity
of Government property utilized in thd same project." 6 Since the
permit land was not used in the dam and reservoir project, 7 the rule
has no application to Fuller.
78. 389 U.S. 121 (1967).
79. Id. at 126.
80. 409 U.S. at 500.
81. Id. at 492.
82. Id. at 500.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 500. This statement is obviously limited by general property and tort
law concepts of nuisance. See, e.g., McFarlane v. City of Niagara Fails, 247 N.Y.
340, 160 N.E. 391 (1928).
85. See United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 497-500 (Powell, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 500.
87. Id. at 495.
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The; third view suggested by Justice Powell was the most far
reaching. The dissent hinted that the water rights cases might have
been wrongly decided.
[lit is important to remember when interpreting them [the water
rights cases] that they cut sharply against the grain of the fundamental notion of just compensation, that a person from whom the
Government takes land iss8 entitled to the market value, including
location value, of the land.
Given these numerous alternative interpretations of Miller, Cors,
and the water rights cases, the decision in Fulleris questionable.8 9
Summary
Several points warrant reiteration in reviewing this opinion. First,
separation of the value of the government asset the permit land, from
the value created by location next to it is essential for a clear understanding of this case. The issue was clearly enunciated in the district
court's instructions to the jury:
'[I]n determining the value of the fee land and in awarding compensation to the owners, you should consider the availability and
accessibility of the permit and leased land and its use in conjunction with the fee land taken and give to the fee land such value
as, in your judgment, according to the evidence, should be given
on account of such availability and accessibility of the permit and
leased land, if any.'9 0
The judge cautioned the jury not to give any value to the permit itself
and to remember that the permit could be revoked at any time without
necessitating compensation by the government.9 1
The second point is that the government asset remained substantially unchanged both before and after the condemnation proceeding.
The 92land still was available as permit land under the Taylor Grazing
Act.
The third point is that even though the permit did not "create
title, interest or estate in or to the lands,"9 " the permits
right,
any
were of "considerable value to ranchers and served a corresponding
public interest in assuring the 'most beneficial use' of range lands."9 4
Hence, land value on the open market included its proximity to federal permit land. Calculation of land's value "artificially denuded of
88. Id. at 500.
89. As Justice Powell phrased this for the dissent: "Neither of the lines of cases
on which the Court relies seems apposite." Id. at 498.
90. Id. at 496 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 497.
92. Id. at 495.
93. Id. at 489.
94. Id. at 495.
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was contrary to principles of the market place and

of fairness.
The significance of these points is that the Fullers' land should
have been afforded location value, for location is an inextricable part
of a land's market value. Whether a parcel of land is situated near
as school, a church, a bus stop, a shopping center, a vacant lot, or
federal grazing land is relevant in deciding how much it is worth in
the market place. Whether or not the owner utilizes that school, is
a member of that church, rides the bus, shops at those stores, plays
baseball in the vacant lot, or has a permit to use the federal land
should be irrelevant. The price the buyer is willing to pay has nothing
to do with the other rights possessed by the present owner, such as
a permit to graze cattle, unless they are covenants running with the
land. The price will be affected, however, by the current and potential
use of the property in light of its location.
In discussing the issues in Fuller, Justice Rehnquist said: "The
constitutional requirement of just compensation derives as much content from the basic equitable principles of fairness as it does from
technical concepts of property law."906 It is difficult to see how denial
of location value to a property owner would serve either of these principles.
Conclusion
The underlying significance of just compensation cases like
United States v. Fuller may not be readily apparent until an accounting is made. In United States v. Twin City Power Co., the appraised
value of the land was between 1.2 and 1.6 million dollars, yet the
value resulting from the majority's ruling was $150,841.45. 97 In
United States v. Fullerthe difference was equally staggering. "Respondents' witnesses valued the land at -figures up to nearly a million dollars, while the government's expert witness assigned it a value of
$136,500. In what was manifestly a compromise, the jury awarded
$350,000."'98 Clearly, the monetary impact can be considerable.
The views expressed in Fuller pose a continuing threat to landowners in that they may not be reimbursed for their property's location
value if it is taken under eminent domain. Fuller not only dampened
hope that the Court would adopt the indemnity theory but also marked
a retreat from the strict market value concepts in favor of the modified
market value rule.9 9 This slow but continuous erosion of the just com95. Id. at 504.
96. Id. at 490.

97. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. at 236-37 nn. 8, 9 (1956).
98. 409 U.S. at 504 n.8 (1973).
99. See text accompanying notes 8-20 supra.
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pensation concept is contrary to the philosophy upon which the Fifth
Amendment was based. Just compensation was placed in historical
perspective when Justice Brewer wrote for the Court in Monongahela
NavigationCo. v. United States:
The first ten amendments to the Constitution, adopted as they
were soon after the adoption of the Constitution, are in the nature
of a bill of rights, and were adopted in order to quiet the apprehension of many, that without some such declaration of rights the
government would assume, and might be held to possess, the
power to trespass upon those rights of persons and property which
by the Declaration of Independence were affirmed to be unalienable rights ....
And in this there is a natural equity which commends it to
every one. It in no wise detracts from the power of the public
to take whatever may be necessary for its uses; while, on the other
hand, it prevents the public from loading upon one individual
more than his share of the burdens of government, and says that
when he surrenders to the public something more and different
from that which is exacted from other members of the public,
a full and just equivalent shall be returned to him. 10 0
The apprehensions were real at the time of the adoption of the Bill
of Rights, and they are renewed today.
100. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1893).

